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THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS AN)
POSSESSION AS PART PERFORMANCE THEREUNDER
The English Parliament in 1676 passed the Statute of
Frauds, an act which was unequivocal in its terms, but in less
than a decade after its enactment, the courts began to make
exceptions, and these exceptions form the basis of the great
modern doctrine of part performance.
In 1685, Sir George Jeifreys, Lord Chancellor under
James II, delivered the decision in Butcher v. Stapely' which
being soon followed by Foxoroft v. Lester2 laid the foundation
and precedent for that great chain of cases which formulates
the modern doctrine.
The chancellors of the time did not wish to see a statute
which had been passed for the prevention of fraud become an
instrument of fraud. By seizing upon the title of the act they
forsook its literal and mandatory.provisions to seek justice in
the wiser field of their own' discretion. This is not unusual nor
unexpected when the general conditions of the time are con-
sidered. According to Dean Pound:
"rWhen Butcher v. Stapely was decided the air was'full of ideas of
natural law, on a higher plane than any human legislation, aud the
courts of law were about to decide that the king, in particular cases
and on necessary and urgent occasions, could in his discretion dispense
with the penal statutes.' If for good reasons James II might dispense
with a statute of Charles II requiring public officers to take a test oath,
Lord Jeffreys might well feel that James' Chancellor for good reasons
might dispense with another statue of Charles II requiring contracts
for the sale of land to be in writing."'
The cases naturally fall into two great divisions, fraud and
part performance. Further classifying the part performance
group divides them also into two groups (a) where possession
has been taken under the contract and (b) where possession is
not possible and part performance is had in some other way.
Following this classification, wherever 'delivery of possession is
11 Vern 363, 23 Engl. Rep. 524.
22 Vern. 456, Colles 108, 1 Engl. Rep. 205.
a Goden v. Hales, Comb. 21, 2 Shower 475.
4 33 Harvard Law Review 929.
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possible the cases either fall under the divisions fraud or
possession.5
Pomeroy differs from Pound, holding that the cases all go
on a doctrine which he summarizes as "equitable fraud." 6 This
theory is expressed in Gallagher v. Gallagher.7 The argument
in favor of Mr. Pomeroy's doctrine is almost unanswerable.
There appears no logical grounds for distinguishing possession
cases from fraud, but the law has grown up in that way, not-
withstanding.
The doctrine of holding possession, either alone or accom-
panied by further acts, to be part performance sufficient to take
the case wherein it is found from the operation of the statute
of frauds has its basis in one or more of four main arguments,
(a) livery of seisin, (b) the argument that the vendee might
otherwise be sued as a trespasser, (e) the theory that the statute
should be viewed from a procedural and not a substantive point
of view, and (d) the argument that to hold otherwise would
work a virtual fraud upon the vendee.
In favor of the livery of seisin theory for allowing posses-
sion to take a case from the statute, the idea is well expressed
in Poorman v. Kilgore :8
"But as the customs of the country can never be suddenly and entirely
broken down even by an act of Parliament it was natural that many
cases should arise founded on the old customs where great injustice
would be done unless the statute should receive an equitable interpre-
tation."
The same general theory has also been developed by Mr.
Justice Holt.9
Harvard Law Review 939.
e Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, 4 ed., section 1409.
7 31 W. Va. 9, 13; 5 S. E. 297, which states: "The fraud which will
entitle the purchaser to a specific prformance is that which consists
in setting up the statute against the performance after the purchaser
has been infduced to make expenditures, or a change of situation in
regard to the subject matter of the agreement upon the supposition
that it was to be carried into execution; and the assumption of rights
thereby to be acquired; so that the refusal ta complete the execution
of the agreement is not merely a denial of the rights it was intended
to confer, but the infliction of an unjust and unconscientious injury
and loss. In such case the vendor is held by force of his acts or silent
acquiescence which have misled the purchaser to his harm to be
estopped from setting up the statute of frauds."
*26 Pa. 365, 67 Am. Dec. 425.
1 39 W. Va. 160, 19 S. E. 391.
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Livery of seisin was at first acebmpanied by much formality
but as time went on the formality decreased and the number
of sales of land increased so that livery of sdisin became common
and unceremonial. Because of its degraded nature it offered
great opportunity for fraud and the unjust deprivation of land
from its just and equitable owner.'
0 and 11
Livery of seisin being forgotten soon after the passage of
the statute, it is urged that the courts have followed the decisions
which held that possession will take the case from the statute
without knowing the reasons which actuated the old courts in
reaching these decisions.
The argument has been advanced that unless possession is
permitted to make the case an exception to the statute the vendor
might sue the vendee as a trespasser.' 2 To permit the vendor
to bring such an action after he has put the vendee into pos-
session under a verbal contract would be to permit him to take
advantage of his own wrong in repudiating his obligation and
would be punishing the vendee for having complied with his
own promise.' 3 This doctrine is explained in Wilson v. West
HartlepooZ By. Co.14 But would it not be a complete defense to
prove that the vendee at worst was a licensee? The statute
would be no bar to setting up the contract as a defense to show
that the vendee was not a trespasser. So the court reasoned in
Ann Berta Lodge No. 421, I. 0. 0. F. v. Livermore.15
" Roberts, Statute of Frauds.
11 Statute of Frauds, Browne, 4th Ed. 4.
1 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, see. 104.
8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 870, note.
2 De G. J. & S. 475, 46 Engl. Rep. 459.
42 Texas 18, wherein the court says: "But is there in fact any
necessity to enforce a contract, in violation of the plain letter of the
law, to afford the purchaser protection against suits which, no doubt,
in equity and good conscience he should have? To enable the pur-
chaser to defend himself against such suits it is insisted that he must
give in evidence the whole contract under which he entered. Grant
it. The statute does not preclude the court from hearing proof of this
kind if presented for any legitimate purpose. It merely forbids charg-
ing the party on such a contract after it has been proved. And surely
if the court can to prevent fraud decree performance of the contract,
notwithstanding the statute, it can protect the defendant on the same
ground against the consequence of acts done under it and at the in-
stance of the plaintiff. Delivery of possession might with more pro-
priety be treated as license to enter and enjoy the rents and profits.
And such license would surely protect against an action for trespass
or rents, when the contract of sale through the default of the vendor has
not been carried out, or, by the reason of the statute, cannot be en-
forced."
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Since the vendee can establish the contract to show that
he was not a trespasser the court can give full credit to the con-
tract so established. From this it appears that the statute of
frauds is procedural in its operation and not substantive and
that a contract established by delivery of possession not explain-
able except by the contract does not come within the prohibition
of the statute.
1 6
On the other hand, an argument in favor of the doctrine
that fraud and not livery of seisin influenced the courts in hold-
ing delivery of possession as good part performance is the fact
that an examination of early cases which went on the ground
of possession having been delivered discloses no hint that the
courts were trying to protect the people in the exercise of their
ancient customs, but rather reveals the desire to render general
justic and equity.17 and Is
In. a few states the provisions of the statutes relating to
contracts for the sale of land or any interest therein have .been
held to require in all cases a memorandum in writing to make
such contracts enforceable either in law or in equity.19
Courts which follow the livery bf seisin idea have sufficient
justification for holding that possession alone is sufficient part
performance. The better reasoned decisions however, seem to
hold that the basis of part performance is fraud and in juris-
dictions where the doctrine is founded on fraud it seems more
reasonable to hold that possession alone is not sufficient, but
such acts are necessary together with the mere delivery of pos-
session as would make a strict enforcement of the statute operate
as a fraud upon the vendee. A contrary doctrine is expressed
in Pugh v. Good.2 0  In Glass v. Hulbert2 l is found what we
believe to be the sounder doctrine.
There are certain general requirements which must neces-
sarily characterize the possession in order to make it an act of
part performance. In the first place the possession of the ven-
dee must be actual and notorious, 22 and the acts of possession
"Williston, Contracts, 494.
AMorphet v. Jones, S. C. 1 Wils. Oh. 100, 36 Engl. Rep. 344.
"Butcher v. Stapely, supra.
"By decisions in Kentucky, Mlississippi, North Carolina, and
Tennessee.
3 Watts and S. 56, 37 Am. Dec. 534.
102 Mass. 25, 3 Am. Rep. 418.
= 46 W. Va. 99, 33 S. E. 108.
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must be in pursuance of the contract. 23  The possession, how-
ever, must be not only in pursuance of the contract but exclu-
sfvely referrable to the contract as pleaded. In Allen v.
Bermis 24 Chief Justice Bishop, of the Supreme Court of Iowa
makes the following assertion:
"It has been repeatedly held and is now a well settled doctrine,
that the continuance in possession by a tenant cannot be deemed a part
performance, or to be such possession as to take the case out of the
statute. The possession must unequivocally refer to and result from
the agreement."
Still another requirement is that the possession must be
exclusive. 25 Furthermore, the possession must also be with the
consent of the vendor and for the purpose of the transfer as
expressed in the verbal contract. The reason for the rule is
indicated in Foster v. Maginnis.26 The English rule is appar-
ently well settled upon the proposition that the delivery of pos-
session alone is sufficient part performance 27 and.28  In
America several states follow the doctrine that possession
alone is sufficient, but even more hold that possession alone is
insufficient.
29
Having studied the development of the rule and its crystal-
ization to the present day law in the different jurisdictions we
come to the more difficult philosophical problem as to what the
law should be and the character of the present tendency. When
we look at the wording of the statute and compare the law as
expressed therein with the application of that law under the
doctrine of part performance we are struck by the wide variance
between the law as handed down by Parliament and the state
legislatures and the law as applied by the courts. That this
variance exists will admit of but little doubt.
"32 L. J. Ch. 441, 55 Engl. Rep. 175.
170 Iowa 172, 94 N. W. 560.
"43 W. Va. 149, 27 S. E. 309.
89 Cal. 264, 26 Pac. 828, wherein Justice Garroute says: "Equit-
able fraud is the basis of this character of action; that is, fraud as a
necessary consequence of setting up the statute as a defense and the
vendor thus securing for himself the benefits of the acts of part per-
formance. It follows from this principle that the acts of part perform-
ance must be done by the party seeking to enforce the contract and
must be done with the conesnt and knowledge of the other party."
"Lord Aylesford's Case, 2 Strange 783.
Cerk, v. Wright, 1 Atk. 12.
" See list of cases in the American Law Institute's Restatement
of the Law of Contracts, section 194.
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Recognizing the departure of the courts from the letter of
the- law and their establishment thereby of a doctrine cut from
whole cloth, having its parentage in judicial legislation, we next
turn to the reasons for this departure to determine whether
those reasons still exist or whether the structure still stands
after its foundations have antiquated and decayed.
The four main reasons for holding possession to be part
performance discussed previously but can be re-enumerated here
are fraud, livery of seisin, the trespasser argument, and the
argument that the statute of frauds is procedural rather than
substantive. The fourth of these arguments is not generally
accepted and the third is inherently fallacious. Let us proceed
then to inspect the remaining causes for the doctrine of part
performance.
It is true that the livery of seison was a custom firmly
emplanted in the minds and habits of the people at the time of
the enactment of the statute but it was this very custom that
that statute was intended to change.30 Today the custom of
livery of seisin is forgotten. Why, therefore, should the courts
continue to follow a rule the reason for which has long since
ceased to exist.
This would make it appear that the only acceptable modern
reason for the doctrine of part performance is to protect the
parol contractee against fraud. If the court followed the Ken-
tucky rule and refused to recognize part performance they could
uphold the statute but give the complainant an equitable lien on
the land to insure him against loss and that he would be returned
to status quo. Under such a rule -what fraud can he claim to have
worked upon him other than his inability to enforce what by the
statute he never had a legal right to enforce.
31
The modern tendency is in recognition of the logic of the
Kentucky rule and is expressed by Justice Strong of the
Supreme Court of Peimsylvania:
"It annot be overlooked that the tendency of modern decision has
been to return to the plain reading of the statute. Experience has
shown that the departures which courts of equity at first sanctioned
have broughf back all the evils which it was the purpose of the statute
of frauds to remedy. They have caused the title to land, which in all
civilized communities has been regarded as of first importance, to be
dependent upon the frail recollection of witnesses, stimulated and per-
Poorman v. Kilgore, 26 Pa. 365, 67 Am. Dec. 425.
3 Usher v. Flood, 83 Ky. 552.
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verted by the apparent hardships of a particular case, a case which
could never have arisen had the mandate of the legislature been
obeyed."12
In view of the fact that such a condition of variance,
instability, and the opportunity for gain by the adoption of
fraudulent practices nourished under the doctrine of part per-
formance, the idea naturally occurs of a second legislative
enactment enforcing a rule similar to the Kentucky rule which
would accomplish the purpose intended by the original statute
and curing the defects which decisions have given rise to in its
administration. Would not the accomplishment of such a pur-
pose, together with the stabilization and uniformity which would
naturally result, be sufficient motive for legislative enactment
in the furtherance of moral justice and universal equity?
-ROBERT M. ODEAR.
2Hil v. Meyers, 43 Penn. St. Rep. 170.
